Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck, London)
MON MAY 14 — 15.00-17.00
Sala "Enzo Paci" — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)
Counterfactuals and Indeterminacy
Many counterfactuals seem to have no determinate truth value, and yet are easily judged to be probable or improbable, for instance: 'If you had picked a red ball it would have had a red spot (when 90% of the red balls have black spots); 'If I had approached, the dog would have attacked me'; 'If you had had the operation, you would have been cured'. I consider a way of treating this indeterminacy, which can also be applied to vague statements, and show that it is compatible with the conditionals having truth conditions, although it is often indeterminate what their truth value is.