Davide Bordini (University of Milano)

February 24 MON — 12.30-14.30

Sala Riunioni — Direzione del Dipartimento (Via Festa del Perdono 7, Milano)

Intentionalism and the Problem of Moods

Abstract: Intentionalism is a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character (what it’s like), according to which the phenomenal character of experience is entirely reducible/identical to what experience represents (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 1995, 2000). This view is strongly motivated by the phenomenological evidence that our sensory experiences appear to be directed upon specific objects: e.g., we see red cars parked over the street, we hear sounds coming from the street, etc. However, when it comes to other kinds of experiences, such as moods (states like anxiety or depression or elation), Intentionalism has hard times. Indeed, moods do not seem to be directed at any object. On the contrary, they appear as “raw feelings:” purely qualitative experiences rather than representations. In this talk I introduce the problem of moods, discuss some recent intentionalist replies and argue that they are not convincing.